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## Introspection and Transformation in Philosophy Today

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*In Remembrance of Michel Foucault (1926-1984)*

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The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things from the standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by redemption: all else is reconstruction, mere technique.<sup>1</sup>  
– Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*

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There is no question that modern and contemporary philosophy have developed remarkable conceptual tools and have used these tools to marshal brilliant accounts of who we think we are as we diagnose transcendental and historical sources of human dis-ease, and point towards who we might otherwise become. Through the capacity of radical reflexivity, a gift of modernity, philosophy has seeded a number of interrelated lineages of critique – Hegelian, Marxian, Nietzschean, Critical Theoretic, Foucaultian – that in varying and mutually invigorating ways clarify our conditions of existence, making the tacit background of our practices and lives more explicit, so to re-orient our ways of being in the world. This is an extraordinary achievement, and so very important (given the complexity of modern conditions) because it means that

philosophical engagement can and does make a difference for those who are willing to take up its considerable intellectual demands.

Nevertheless, there has been a down side to this achievement and a loss for philosophy in modern times. And this has to do with philosophical activity becoming richly and narrowly centered on analytical thought and language-use.

In *On Religion* John Caputo points directly to the issue when he notes that Kant treats the ontological argument for the existence of God as a task of textual and logical exegesis, which results in Kant's demonstration that Anselm's proof is flimsy, both conceptually and logically. How could Anselm ever have taken this "proof" seriously? Caputo's answer is that for Anselm the ontological argument was not, as it was for Kant, a matter of cognition alone, but used as part of a ramified spiritual practice.<sup>2</sup> We can imagine that Anselm *first* would have engaged in some preparatory exercise – chanting, praying, being still – allowing any strong sense of a separate self to fall away, opening what in the middle ages was called the eye of spirit (what today might be referred to as the allowing of naked awareness to come forward, the noticing of pure consciousness)<sup>3</sup> – and *then* would have made use of the "argument," not as a proof in and of itself, but more along the lines of the medieval monastic technique of *lectio divina* – a meditative listening-to rather than a critical analysis of the text. Within the context of a multifaceted practice of self, Anselm would have listened to the "proof" as a devotional aid in the awakening of the soul, the freeing of the pure presence of awareness.

In contrast, Kant's approach to the ontological proof is thoroughly modern, exemplifying a new philosophical concern for and rigor in thinking, one that would come to empower the critical stance, marking an advance in the history of philosophical

thought in its commitment to thought's radical reflexivity – but at a cost that eschews practices and procedures not concerned directly and immediately with engendering clear, critical thinking.

Anselm's use of the ontological argument is located within a long, complex history of Western views and practices of inwardness. Modern philosophical introspection stands within this tradition and Husserl's eidetic reduction is an exemplary instance.<sup>4</sup> What role does introspection play in early Husserl? As presented in *Ideen I*, the eidetic reduction exercises the mental faculties, especially the imagination, to disclose the *eidōs* or essences located in intentional consciousness. But to what end? Does the method in any clear manner transform that consciousness? Or is it most basically a step in a larger project that has as its overarching *telos* the building of a theory that demonstrates the primacy of transcendental subjectivity in lieu of physicalist and reductionist psychologisms of the soul? Whatever transformation might occur from using the method, the gleaning of evidence seems to be of utmost intent. In contrast, Anselm's use of the ontological argument is clearly oriented towards transformation, de-contracting consciousness, and realizing the radiance within. This transformation is not geared towards demonstrating the validity of a theory.

Foucault's late work on ethics can shed light on the gap between the meditative procedures of Anselm and the modernity of philosophers such as Kant and Husserl. Towards the end of his famous April 1983 interview with Bert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, which was published as "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress," Foucault noted that:

. . . we must not forget that Descartes wrote "meditations" – and meditations are a practice of the self. But the extraordinary thing in Descartes' texts is that he

succeeded in substituting a subject as founder of practices of knowledge, for a subject constituted through practices of the self . . . In European culture up to the sixteenth century, the problem [from antiquity] remains: What is the work which I must effect upon myself so as to be capable and worthy of acceding to the truth? To put it another way: truth always has a price; no access to truth without *ascesis* . . . Descartes, I think, broke with this when he said, “To accede to truth, it suffices that I be *any* subject which can see what is evident.” Evidence is substituted for *ascesis* at the point where the relationship to the self intersects the relationship to others and the world. The relationship to the self no longer needs to be ascetic to get into relation to the truth. It suffices that the relationship to the self reveals to me the obvious truth of what I see for me to apprehend that truth definitively. Thus, I can be immoral and know the truth. I believe that this was an idea which, more or less explicitly, was rejected by all previous culture. Before Descartes, one could not be impure, immoral, and know the truth. With Descartes, direct evidence is enough. After Descartes, we have a non-ascetic subject of knowledge. This change makes possible the institutionalization of modern science.<sup>5</sup>

Foucault goes on to say in the interview that the ascetical impetus does not simply disappear in modern philosophy, a point which he had made earlier in the 1981-1982 lectures at the Collège de France on *L’herméneutique du subject*.<sup>6</sup> How does the transformative impulse manifest in modern thought?

Although Foucault’s remarks on the ethics of truth-telling in the philosophical tradition are fragmentary, they do, I think, begin to clarify the modernity of Kant and Husserl. Kant differs from Anselm in that for the latter understanding the ontological proof of God’s existence requires a prior and ongoing ascetic work on oneself, whereas for Kant, understanding the argument requires no prior labor, but is a *matter of exercising one’s cognitive powers as they already stand*. Our consciousness, right now, is sufficiently expansive and rational to assess the validity of the argument. In the case of the early Husserl, the eidetic reduction exercises our faculties to disclose a broader truth, that of the primacy of transcendental subjectivity. This echoes the pre-modern injunction to work upon oneself as a precondition for acceding to truth. But the introspection here is not assuredly transformative of intentional consciousness, but again, as in Kant, is a

*demonstration about the workings of consciousness as it already exists*; the method is a means of gathering evidence in making and verifying a theoretical point. While retaining spiritual resonances proper to the earlier tradition of inwardness, the Husserlian approach to introspection has much to do with phenomenology's desire to realize itself as a science with its own methods and introspective evidence proper to an inner rather than outer empiricism.<sup>7</sup> If there is a question of identity here it seems to turn on the philosopher's self-understanding as practitioner of a rigorous science that is rationally open to and able to ascertain evidence about the truth or falsity of claims about transcendental constitution.

Whatever ascetical impulses might be found in early phenomenology, the Husserl of the *Krisis* unabashedly calls for a change in the modern psyche. The opening of that great text argues that the crisis in culture is exemplified by the loss of meaning in the natural sciences. Philosophy's task is first to ground itself and then, from this self-grounding, secure the moral significance and rationality of the sciences. Philosophical self-clarification is the means for steering European culture in a healthier direction. (Assumed here is modern philosophy's self-understanding as a more or less autonomous realm of discourse – having striking parallels to modernist art's self-understanding and self-claimed importance<sup>8</sup> – a point to which we shall return.) There is a passionate spiritual impulse in the *Krisis*. Husserl is onto something important in the history of science: the loss of science's nourishment in the lifeworld. But while such insightful theory clarifies the situation, does it empower our ways of intervening in culture at large in creative, effective, and wise ways? Does such theory in and of itself *transform* our capacities for re-engaging the world? Or might it more properly be said to provide a new

set of beliefs for a consciousness that as such remains the same in its transcendental constitution and agential resources?

In the phenomenological tradition, Heidegger's critique of intentional consciousness in *Sein und Zeit*, notably the sections devoted to being-towards-death and authenticity, is a profound expression of modern thought's impetus to transform. Becoming authentic, as a modification of one's socialization, gathers and aligns Dasein's being in the world with the destiny and fate of a community. Yet, in a characteristically modern move (or lack of one), Heidegger never suggests a specific technique to enact, empower, or provoke our seeing into the groundlessness of our received identities and spark awakening into a more authentic life – whereas such practices abound in the religious lineages of world. Even in the more mystical dialogue on *Gelassenheit*, we are given no injunctions or instructions that might enable the “leap” into the Open, the letting go of representation's subject-object horizon into the more primordial open region where thinking, freed from willing, comes forth in its essence. Here too, the religious lineages in their esoteric strains as well in their contemporary Western offshoots offer “techniques” for releasing the subjective stance: the pointing out instructions in the Dzogchen teachings of Tibetan Buddhism, Self-inquiry as introduced by Ramana Maharshi, the effortless effort of just sitting proper to the Zen “practice” of *Zazen*, the prayer of union and centering prayer in contemplative Christianity, the yoga of supreme rest as taught by the contemporary American Eli Jaxon-Bear, and more. In each case the “technique” or instruction uniquely helps us notice and release our subjective stance into the Open.<sup>9</sup>

To be sure, with Heidegger and others in the phenomenological tradition who have taken seriously the call “back to the things themselves,” there seems to be

something akin to “pointing out instructions” in their writings – and indeed when de-contextualized, selected passages can operate as such (and often beautifully so). But, by and large, the flow of philosophical discourse pulls attention back into the conceptual unfolding of what is finally a theoretical presentation. To use the Zen metaphor of the finger pointing at the moon: moments in the movement of the text point to the moon, but never quite release this pointing, never advocate that the linguistic-showing be deeply surrendered or suspended; with the consequence that one again notices the finger in lieu of what the finger is gesturing towards, awareness falling back into the content of thought, the instance of pointing out the depths of our primordial beingness and responsiveness functioning primarily as a moment of evidence in a conceptual demonstration that as such mutes potentials in the passage to spur us towards radical self-release and transformation.

In general, modern philosophy has forfeited a wide array of techniques of self-transformation, while at the same time, with great brilliance, has increasingly focused upon evidence, critical thought, theory’s import, and skillful language-use. It seems to me that Foucault’s late work on ethics, as a refiguring of Division Two of *Sein und Zeit*, was pressing towards the historical repetition and recovery of forgotten practices of self in order to empower self-transformation, thereby complementing philosophical reflection.<sup>10</sup>

The transformative impulse is alive and well in philosophy today. But what is often considered “transformative” is more like a description of heretofore unspecified conditions of thinking and being. The modern episteme’s trope of thinking the unthought, first articulated by Foucault in *Les mots et les choses*,<sup>11</sup> underwrites many of the innovations in recent philosophy: social domination as the hidden origin of the moral

dualisms of good/bad, good/evil (Nietzsche); transcendental subjectivity as what constitutes the natural attitude (Husserl); the groundlessness of the “I am” as the thoughtless background of the *cogito* (Heidegger); the question of being as the unasked question behind the tradition’s questioning (Heidegger); the chiasmic flesh of the world as the source of perception and the fluid subject/object horizon (Merleau-Ponty); power as shaping the historical ways of telling the truth (Foucault); ethics as the unthinkable condition of ontology (Levinas); justice as the undeconstructable fundament of deconstruction (Derrida); and so on. In each case, the theory purports to think the unthought of previous theorizing, which deepens our understanding of the ways of being, knowing, and acting; with the gesture seeming to claim more for itself than re-description, as if the disclosure of the unseen condition, the act of critical reflection, not only thinks the unthought, but tacitly effects a transformation. Thinking discloses anew and effects a transformation in what has been referenced in the disclosure. Re-describing the conditions of thinking and acting, however, does not automatically enact a transformation of capacities. To believe so risks confounding the constative and performative dimensions of language.

*Excursus: Meditations on Emptiness*

A reader might take what has been said so far is an invective against thought – but it is not. One will think so only if attached to modern philosophical intellect-only procedures. *Suggesting that thinking has limits for transformation is not the same as saying that thinking is not important* – although one can imagine the contemporary philosophical self having a tough time attending to this distinction.

Tibetan Buddhism presents an example of how rigorous scholarly thought can be tied to ascetical practices of transformation. The Gelupka order in particular espouses the need for intensive scholarly study tied to discursive meditation. Following the teachings of lineage founder Tsong Khapa, the *Lam rim* (“stages of the path”) sets forth a series of graded analytical meditations beginning with topics like death and suffering, moving onto to compassion, and culminating on the emptiness of self and other where successful completion of these analytic meditations on emptiness sets the stage for initiation into tantra.<sup>12</sup>

Briefly set forth, the monk enrolled in a monastic college and seeking a Geshe degree (roughly equivalent to a Western Ph.D.) studies the Asian tradition of philosophies of emptiness that descend from Nagarjuna, eventually taking up and immersing himself in the Consequential Middle Way school of analysis (*Prasangika Madhyamika*).<sup>13</sup> Scholarly study at this advanced intellectual stage, which includes regular debate amongst the monks, is not an end in itself, but supports a daily regime of intensive analytic meditations on the emptiness of self and other. Theory is not an end in itself, nor is theory primary. The goal is not to hold onto a new set of beliefs but the radical transformation of the monk through stabilizing the direct “seeing” into the emptiness of self beyond all conceptualization. Such a “seeing” leads to direct realization of “no-self” without rejecting or neglecting the importance of intelligent language use. The Tibetan teachings profess that without the meditation on emptiness energized through stable one-pointed attention, there will be little or no transformation in the monk’s consciousness. The rigorous study and debating of theory, in and of itself divorced from meditation, is considered unlikely to spark liberation.

*Translation is not Transformation*

One common response to the claims so far forwarded is to textualize, theorize, or analyze the non-theoretical practices of self as if they were propositions that are true or false, rather than seeing them as exercises that transform our being. Modern and contemporary philosophy – and the culture as a whole – has the tendency to want to debate and assess such claims about the transformative power of practice without *actually taking up the given practice and testing it out*. Hidden under the mask of a supposedly tough-minded skepticism is a pre-rational slant that is not truly open to the available *evidence* – where the evidence in this case is the fruit of engaging the practice. It is like assessing the taste of some exotic, complex food dish by looking over the menu or reading the recipe, rather than eating or cooking the actual food. There is a propensity to move again and again back to cognition and thinking alone, to some form of theorizing. Consider the contemporary fervor and debates about ethics, care, and love for the other in Levinas and the later Derrida. These theories are powerful, and at times quite brilliant and moving; no doubt they re-direct us away from the instrumental and administrative rationality of our lives and toward matters of compassion. In this sense they are very fruitful. But – and this is a big “but” – how much does engagement with these theories, our thinking with and about them, in and of themselves, enlarge our capacity to love, really love, to open up and respond to the command of the other? And what about the shadowed and reactive facets of our psychic conditioning, which when innocently (and so readily) triggered short-circuit a loving responsiveness no matter how many times we have read and enjoyed a book like *Totality and Infinity*?

Here Ken Wilber's distinction between translation and transformation is helpful. For Wilber, transformation is an expansion of consciousness that fundamentally reconditions the *forms* of thinking, feeling, and acting. (And where radical transformation – awakening, liberation, Christ-consciousness, no-self, Self – is the dismantling of the solid self-sense altogether.) Translation, on the other hand, is more of a lateral movement, a re-description within the same basic form of consciousness. As Wilber explains:

With translation, the self is simply given a new way to think or feel about reality. The self is given a new belief – perhaps holistic instead of atomistic, perhaps forgiveness instead of blame, perhaps relational instead of analytic . . . But with transformation, the very process of translation itself is challenged, witnessed undermined, and eventually dismantled . . . [For] at some point in our maturation process, translation itself, no matter how adequate or confident, simply ceases to console. No new belief, no new paradigm, no new myth, no new ideas, will staunch the encroaching anguish . . . [Yet] in today's America . . . [the] vast majority of leading edge of horizontal spiritual adherents often claim to be representing the leading edge of spiritual transformation, the 'new paradigm' that will change the world, the 'great transformation' of which they are the vanguard. But more often than not, they are not deeply transformative at all; they are merely but aggressively translative – they do not offer effective means [to first transform and then eventually] to utterly dismantle the self, but merely ways for the self to think differently. Not ways to transform, but merely ways to translate. In fact, what most of them offer is not a practice or a series of practices; not *sadhana* or *satsang* or *shikan-taza* or yoga. What most of them offer is simply the suggestion: read my book on the new paradigm. This is deeply disturbed, and deeply disturbing.<sup>14</sup>

At any moment there are better and worse translations, better and worse re-descriptions of who we are; with translation coming into play even with the dissolution of the solid self-sense. Furthermore, within a given form of consciousness there regularly arises an increasingly skillful exercising of capacities proper to that consciousness, which is an expression of a finer and finer *competency*. Wilber is not against translation, but is warning about the common confounding of translation and transformation – that

translations abound in culture today, and are so often mistaken for transformation. Transformation is a far more demanding task.

The impetus to transform animates philosophy. In a number of late writings, especially the essay on “What is Enlightenment?,” Foucault speculated that modern philosophy, as a critical ontology of the self, concerns itself with a “way out” (*Ausgang*) from the present.<sup>15</sup> As we have seen, this way out from the present is regularly enacted textually through the trope of thinking the unthought. Philosophy is an analytical-theoretical discourse; and theorizing some change is not the same as effectuating change. Reading Derrida on the primacy of the other is not the same as re-conditioning our automatic habits of reacting to and attuning to others; whereas techniques of the heart, as found in most of the world’s wisdom traditions, have proven their effectiveness at achieving deep and stable transformations in practitioners. Engaging in *tonglen* – a profound and simple Tibetan Buddhist practice of dissolving self-cherishing and awakening the cherishing of others<sup>16</sup> – will go farther for most people in reconditioning ingrained habits of self-contraction and freeing up compassionate responsiveness than will the analytical reading of a theoretical tome, be it Western or Eastern. Notwithstanding the predictable objections and rationalizations – that texts are performative or that theory and reading are practices in their own right – the only way to find out about the comparative effectiveness of a self-technique like *tonglen* is to *do* the practice.

None of this is to underestimate the value of reading Levinas, Buber, and Derrida about such matters; it is rather to step in the direction of our getting clearer about acts of translation (which may indeed contribute towards transformation) and explicit time-tested

techniques of transforming the self. We need deep translations to set in motion effective transformation and we need them as well to integrate the results of a transformation – contemporary philosophy is a brilliant and unique source of such insights. But philosophical translations are in and of themselves typically non – or weakly transformative in comparison to the numerous non-theoretical practices of self widely available today.<sup>17</sup> Following Foucault’s lead, we might speculate and generalize that the philosophical legacy of the Cartesian turn in practices of self has entailed that what “I am” as a philosophical self is fundamentally defined by the “I think.” This results in the philosophical self that sees its mission as gifting the world with critical thinking as the means to diagnose the sources of our dis-ease, and also as the medicine for healing the dis-ease so specified. Thinking has assumed a double duty.

*Modern Philosophy and the Disciplinary University: Illusions of Autonomy*

While modern philosophy has turned its critical techniques upon culture and society, it rarely has done so upon itself, that is, it has rarely looked at the historical conditions of doing philosophy today. It often presumes something like its own autonomy, the realm where critical thought is preserved. (Foucault, it seems, was preparing to write a genealogy of philosophy, but died too soon.) Not reflecting critically on its conditions of existence, philosophy risks internalizing habits of thought proper to the culture at large.

Coarsely stated, pre-modern ascetic practices have been replaced by the modern, administrative and disciplinary training of the university, which are procedures of forming the modern philosopher to align tightly with the normalized social institution of

higher education. This has entailed both an advance and a retreat. The post-Cartesian celebration of method and the demand for evidence has had a very positive liberating effect since the pre-modern claim that the Teacher already embodies the Good or Truth via an unquestionable authority could no longer stand absolute in sanctioning the truth-force of philosophical inquiry. The down side has been the focus on cognition-only philosophy, which stresses the skillful use of language and the interpretation of texts. These skills are now stripped of earlier modes of self-work that were never simply false moments to sanction the moral authority requisite to speak the truth. There has been “democratization” in who can do philosophy, with thought, empowered by a radical reflexivity, reaping unparalleled insights into who we are today. This gain has been coupled with the loss of explicitly transformative practices in lieu of normalized training procedures, which entails that modern philosophy has adopted the medicine of the thinking-cure, theoretical discourse serving the twin task of diagnostic and cure.

In this light it can be seen that philosophy has internalized certain habits of modern life more deeply than it may wish to acknowledge. As Simmel, Benjamin, and others have argued, modernity is characterized by the hypertrophy of theoretical consciousness in everyday life serving as shock absorber for newly modern threats to the psyche. Ours is a spectacular culture, a culture of spectators: not playing sports, but watching them; not cooking gourmet food, but watching the Food Network; not working on ourselves to become more loving, but thinking the terms of love.

Related to the rise in the theoretical stance has been an inflated sense of individual subjectivity, about which Weber first talked with such clarity. The iron cage of modernity’s instrumental rationality – subsequently re-articulated and analyzed anew as

reification by Lukacs, the *Gestell* by Heidegger, the totally administered world by Adorno, disciplinary society by Foucault, the society of the spectacle by DeBord, the colonization of the lifeworld by Habermas, and the reign of It/s by Wilber, to name a few of the offshoots of this seminal insight – is what engenders a compensatory and inflated sense of subjectivity. Increasing objectification of human being has mobilized a defensive response, a regressive narcissism, by which the self-sense, the ego, re-asserts itself in light of being leveled by meaningless quantifying forces from without. And this re-assertion, in the face of overwhelming objective forces, entails the mind's exaggeration of its own powers, with thought often taking on a magical hue – edging towards the delusion that thinking makes it so. By not reflecting deeply enough upon its conditions of existence in the modern world, philosophy has not been immune from this cast of mind – that theorizing *about* brings into being. Postmodern thought abounds with exaggerated tones and claims of the importance of the topic under study, and the writer's insightful theory presented as akin to incarnating a transformation. Again, this is not an invective against thinking, nor against modern and contemporary philosophy's genuine advances and importance; it is however a serious call to wake up from the delusion that theoretical re-description is somehow the same as transforming who we are. Given these reflections, how might we imagine a way out?

The philosophy to come, the philosophy on the way, will retain and keep extending the remarkable intellectual riches of modern and contemporary thought, especially as a critique of current conditions of existence. It will cease overtaxing thought with the additional task of effecting greater depth, care, and wisdom in our souls. For what is called for is a rich mining of the transformative technologies of the world's

wisdom traditions and folding them into what it means to be a philosopher and to practice philosophy – this, in short, is what I take to be the spirit of Foucault’s late work on ethics. This “mining” means not only theorizing about love, but engaging in practices to realize ourselves as more loving human beings; not debating what releasement into the Open was for Heidegger, but of tasting it for ourselves, surrendering the separate self-sense and coming to experience directly what is at stake in words like “being,” “releasement,” and the “step back.” (It demands that we curtail the one-sided philological approach to such terms.)

Philosophy so imagined will come to unite the modern gift of the radical reflexivity of thought with the pre-modern concern for acceding to, resting in, and emerging anew from the silence and stillness that is the very source of *logos* – this philosophy to come birthing and nourishing, again and again, a critical wisdom profoundly responsive to what is, energizing our actions for what needs to be done.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life* (1951), trans. E. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1978), 247.

<sup>2</sup> John Caputo, *On Religion* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 38-42.

<sup>3</sup> See Robert K. C. Forman, ed., *The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and *idem*, ed., *The Innate Capacity: Mysticism, Psychology, and Philosophy* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

<sup>4</sup> On inwardness, introspection, and the modern study of consciousness, see Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); and B. Alan Wallace, *The Taboo of Subjectivity: Towards a New Science of Consciousness* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

<sup>5</sup> Michel Foucault, *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Volume 1*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), 278-279.

<sup>6</sup> *L'herméneutique du sujet: Cours au Collège de France, 1981-1982* (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 27-32, 466-467.

<sup>7</sup> On inner empiricism, see Ken Wilber, *The Marriage of Sense and Soul: Integrating Science and Religion* (New York: Broadway Books, 1998), Chapter 10; and cf. Jorge Ferrer, *Revisioning Transpersonal Psychology: A Participatory Vision of Human Spirituality* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), Chapter 3.

<sup>8</sup> For a critical assessment of modernity's autonomous sphere of art, see Peter Bürger, *Theory of the Avant-Garde* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

<sup>9</sup> The yoga of supreme rest is especially direct and effective. See Eli Jaxon-Bear, *Sudden Awakening into Direct Realization* (Tiburon, CA: New World Library, 2004), 107-108. For an excellent collection of verbal spurs and pointing out instructions for release into radical openness, see Josh Baran, ed., *365 Nirvana Here and Now: Living Every Moment in Enlightenment* (London: Harper Collins, 2003).

<sup>10</sup> See Michael Schwartz, "Repetition and Ethics in Late Foucault," *Telos* 117 (Fall 1999), 113-132.

<sup>11</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (1966) (New York: Vintage, 1970), 322-328.

<sup>12</sup> For a comprehensive presentation of the Lam rim meditations, see Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, *Joyful Path of Good Fortune: The Complete Buddhist Path to Enlightenment* (London: Tharpa, 1990).

<sup>13</sup> Fundamental is Tsong Khapa's *Lam rim chen mo*, its sections on emptiness recently translated as *The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment*, volume 3 (Ithaca, NY and Boulder, CO: Snow Lion, 2002).

<sup>14</sup> Ken Wilber, *One Taste: Daily Reflections on Integral Spirituality* (Boston and London: Shambhala, 2000), 26, 33.

<sup>15</sup> Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?," in *Ethics*, 303-319.

<sup>16</sup> Kelsang Gyatso, *Joyful Path*, 433-440.

<sup>17</sup> Integral Institute, located in Boulder, CO., is among the world leaders in gathering and experimentally testing the transformational effectiveness of the world's spiritual technologies and psychological techniques. See [www.integralinstitute.org](http://www.integralinstitute.org), especially its on-line forum Integral Naked. [At the time of the posting of this essay, two new and important I-I sites are up and running – those of Integral Spiritual Center and of Integral Life Practice, the latter at [www.myilp.org](http://www.myilp.org). Also, the Integral Practice Domain at Integral University, when fully up and running, promises to be an extraordinary resource for spiritual practice.]